"What does an iconoclast do when all the icons are broken?", might be the subtitle of this book. Corrigan built his reputation on the back of his previous book, "Mud, Blood and Poppycock", a generally well-received strident attack on the "Lions led by Donkeys" critique of First World War generals. Here Corrigan, an ex-Gurkha Major, seeks to repeat his success by turning his gaze upon Winston Churchill. Unfortunately, in so doing, he demonstrates clearly the trap that faces those historians who self-consciously aim to upend all that has been thought before: either continue to do so, or fade into mediocrity. Despite claiming at the very start of his book "I have no wish to be considered an iconoclast", Corrigan thereafter sets out to be precisely that, all the time illustrating that he takes the position of a professional soldier with contempt for politicians, rather than a professional historian.

An ex-regular soldier, Corrigan is good on the purely military aspects of the build-up to and the fighting of the Second World War. For example, his narrative of the mechanisation of British cavalry, of the strengths and weaknesses of different weapons and items of equipment (tanks, guns, aircraft,) are all well worth reading. Indeed, his other contentious claim "that Britain did not perform well in the Second World War", is arguable, although the case has been better made elsewhere.

Unfortunately, Corrigan, who lists his hobbies in the cover jacket as including "pricking the pompous", has the blinkered approach of being unable to understand that, in total war, politics cannot be entirely ignored. For example, Corrigan blithely asserts that "[Churchill's] demands to sink the French fleet [in 1940 were] unnecessary, for...the French would have come to an agreement without the threat of force," but totally ignores that, whilst Corrigan has the luxury of assuming, in 2006, that that would have been the case, Churchill in 1940 could not take the risk. Moreover, he forgets that the political effect in the USA - proof positive that Britain was absolutely not about to surrender - was dynamite. Things are simple for Corrigan, but they were not for Churchill: yes, he "harboured ideas of continuing to fight in Europe," but the aim of keeping France, with her huge army and effective navy in the war, was not an idle dream that could easily be thrown away, nor could he easily abandon a British presence on the continent, knowing more than anyone else how difficult an amphibious landing would be.

Moreover, Corrigan demonstrates that in his contempt for Winston Churchill, he has failed to learn very much about him. It may be significant that in his bibliography, Corrigan lists four books by David Irving, and only one by Martin Gilbert, and that one not about Churchill. Despite the title of the book, Corrigan actually spends little time talking about Churchill, and almost none in analysis. His critical comments are rarely sourced, never explained, and prefers to make glib comments ("in view of his later treatment of Bomber Command,") rather than engage in the tiresome evidential business of what he really means. Corrigan calls Churchill, "a man who found it difficult to look beyond what he knew and was familiar with", a statement that would not be made by anyone who has ever studied the astonishingly prescient and innovation-minded Churchill (tanks, Mulberry harbours, naval aviation, "funnies", SOE, commandos, anyone?).

Corrigan is often factually wrong. For example: "originally destined for the infantry, he chose instead to join an expensive and gorgeously caparisoned cavalry regiment" - actually Churchill failed to get the grades, on entering Sandhurst, to join the infantry, but wished to join the 4th Hussars because they were a nearby regiment he had come to know well. Another criticism has Churchill down as overruling the Chiefs of Staff, who did not offer sufficient resistance. As is well-known, Churchill never overruled the Chiefs of Staff on a military matter, no matter how much he might press them, and this is much to his credit. Moreover, Churchill did meet serious resistance, not least from the iron-willed Brooke, who Corrigan disparagingly refers to as "Churchill's creature."

The tone, meanwhile, is always irritatingly smug, and sometimes hardly worthy of a serious historian: "there is no question that Churchill was personally brave and completely unafraid of death. The trouble was that he was not afraid of anyone else's death either" (a bizarre comment to anyone who has ever read anything about Churchill's anguish over Gallipoli, or his concern, expressed to Marshall, that a premature invasion of Europe would result in "a sea full of corpses.")

Corrigan's style is sarcastic, with an ill-executed attempt at humour that grates on the reader: "a cabinet that included that scourge of appeasers and standard-bearer for military might, Winston S Churchill."

Where he is not factually wrong, he is selective: he praises Britain for inventing the tank, but does not anywhere mention Churchill's vital role in the enterprise, nor for his role in sponsoring naval aviation. Again, whilst criticising Lloyd-George for the resentment felt by the Army for the demobilisation policy post-World War One, Corrigan does not give credit to the man who sorted it out, and introduced the policy of long-term service that he seems to favour - Churchill.

Where Corrigan does have a point, he spoils it by his antipathy to Churchill. There was no doubt that Churchill was a difficult and demanding boss, who demanded long hours and hard work from those who worked with him. Most sensible historians would however give Churchill credit for leading from the front. Not Corrigan: "It may be unfair to describe him as a drunk, but he certainly consumed more alcohol than was wise for a man of his age and condition, and to keep his professional advisers up half the night...when they, but not he, had a full day's work to look forward to on the morrow, was nothing short of selfish indulgence." Moreover, most of those who worked for Churchill, like Brooke, loved him despite his undoubted difficulties. Corrigan, of course, only quotes the negative aspects from Brooke's diaries, not the positive.

Corrigan is however probably correct that, "Operation Sea Lion was a chimera, and always has been," but gives Churchill no credit for being almost the only person who realised this in 1940. Nor does he give him any credit for making the most of what he had in spreading forces thinly and demanding use be made of them, or that, without Churchill, whatever "damage" he may or may not have inflicted on the war effort, without him, there would have been no war effort at all. But none of this should surprise the reader, for Corrigan has hardly a single positive word to say for Churchill during the whole 1940 section of his book.

When Corrigan does stumble upon a valid historical controversy, he deals with that little better than he does Churchill. One of the most hotly debated topics of the post-war years, the strategic bombing policy, Corrigan devotes a whole three paragraphs to, reaching the heights of analysis expressed in, "Dresden was just one more raid in a long war and was totally justified." Worse, he does not seem to know whether he supports the policy or not, for when Churchill is involved, he is castigated for being "quick to evade the blame for his own policy." On Norway, Churchill is seriously vulnerable to sustained critical analysis, but Corrigan simply cannot provide it, and prefers to stick to his trademark snide remarks ("the great strategist himself", "the great man",) and inappropriate language (Churchill replaces a naval commander with a "chum".)

Perhaps worst of all, Corrigan's judgment is fatally flawed either by his antipathy to his subject, or his devotion to his iconoclastic thesis, which might explain his backtracking when faced with Andrew Roberts on the BBC's Today programme. For example, Corrigan states that, "modern Germany is so terrified of a resurgence of National Socialism that Mein Kampf is banned (banning of books was something that the Nazis did quite a lot of, too)", as if there were some moral equivalence between the two actions.

This lack of judgment is also shown in Corrigan's inability - a basic requirement in a proper historian - to judge the decisions made at the time by the facts known at the time, and not with the benefit of hindsight. He criticises Churchill's belief in the French Army as being "idiocy" that was to prove "utterly and completely erroneous in such a short space of time", but completely ignores the fact that "la Grand Armee" was generally thought in Europe to be unbeatable, to be every bit as strong as in 1918, and that its swift defeat in 1940, was a shock that shook all Europe's assumptions, and from which the French have never really recovered. Proper historians, moreover, do not describe actions or events as "crassly idiotic", not only because it is inappropriate, but because such a sweepingly simplistic phrase is unworthy of the trade they practise. Nor do they describe those who disagree with them as "the Churchill faction." Such language is worse than mere silliness; it is, er, "crassly idiotic."

Corrigan holds that Churchill "was...the man who by his political actions between 1919 and 1929 contributed in very large measure to Britain being unready," for the Second World War, a responsibility that he attributes largely to the rolling "10 Year Rule". Corrigan does not make allowance for the fact that, at the time, Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and being conscientious, did what Chancellors are meant to do: cut expenditure, especially in times of peace and hope (which the 1920s undoubtedly were). Moreover, the rule ended in 1932, four years after Churchill left office, leaving plenty of time for rearmament; the failure to do so being the fault of others (Baldwin hardly gets a mention). Indeed, Churchill's time at the Exchequer ended four years before Hitler came to power, before any danger was manifest. Corrigan's alternative policy would have had the RAF equipped with hundreds of obsolete biplane fighters by the time war came: both a waste of money and potentially suicidal, since, being on squadron strength, they might well have been used.

Furthermore, in a typical phrase, Corrigan characterises Churchill's change of view on rearmament in the 1930s as due to being: "out of office, and increasingly unlikely to regain it...Churchill underwent a conversion that makes the Black Death look like a minor outbreak of the sniffles." Leaving aside the baffling attempt at humour, Corrigan's judgement must surely be questioned when he ascribes Churchill's change of policy on rearmament not to the rise of Hitler (a man whom Corrigan somewhat disturbingly appears to admire,) but to a calculated and false posture for office (which if it was, was totally self-defeating).

In sum, this is a reasonable book, if you ignore everything it says about Winston Churchill. The coverage of the military aspects of the war is good, but sadly, to use a Corrigan-esque phrase, the sound of grinding axes drowns out the sensible, sound narrative. Corrigan is after the quick judgement and the glib throwaway, not a sustained and detailed analysis of difficult and controversial times. If you want reasoned criticism, there are far better books, by such as Lamb, Charmley, Roskill, R. W. Thompson, and the Alanbrook Diaries.

In proving his case that Churchill "was very nearly responsible for losing [the war]", Corrigan must be judged to have failed. He is essentially out to make a splash, but when the ripples subside (as they already have,) the biggest stones sink fastest. In the great pool of Churchill literature, this book is surely destined to sink without trace.