The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam

Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM

The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam

W.W. Rostow (Foreword), Dale Walton

This counterfactual book by C. Dale Walton is a study which challenges the longstanding notion that US defeat in the Vietnam War was inevitable, regardless of whatever the Washington administration did. It argues that, given America's massive economic, military, and political resources compared with North Vietnam's relatively limited resource base, the US could have won the war but prevented itself from doing so due to a series of what proved to irredeemable bad policy decisions by the Johnson admin. The author argues that, had the US govt been more focussed and concentrated on exactly what it wished to achieve in Vietnam, victory was possible and South Vietnam could've been preserved as a viable political entity, but due to American fickleness and uncertainty, North Vietnam, displaying greater determination to achieve its wartime goals of forcible reunification, gained eventual victory.

The author states that the US could even have avoided becoming directly militarily involved in Vietnam (ie not sending troops) had the planners in Washington been more savvy to the realities of the situation in South Vietnam, and designed a plan to effectively support the Saigon govt without needing to deploy American ground forces.

The book goes into detail on such factors as the US govt's over-estimation of the threat of direct Communist military intervention posed by Red China to support North Vietnam, which was grossly exaggerated due to the great historical and cultural differences between the 2 erstwhile Communist countries, and which could've been addressed by more balanced, accurate US intelligence assessments. Another apsect of poor Johnson admin political decision-making was with the determination to treat Laos and Cambodia as neutral zones based on the 1962 Laos Accords, and continuing to preserve this fiction even when it became evident by the late 60s that North Vietnam was deliberately violating the sovereignty of both states thru the Sihanouk and Ho Chi Minh trails to supply men and materiel to the VC's effort in the South.

The book also reflects on a better utilisation of overwhelming American firepower, esp. airpower, instead of the slapdash, piecemeal, telegraphed application of 'pinprick' strikes to force the North Vietnamese to come to the bargaining table, such as with the intense B-52 bombing followed by significant pauses during the course of ROLLING THUNDER, which indicated to the North that Washington wasn't fully committed to the South and only wished to find a quick exit from its commitment. The book supports the argument that had US airpower been employed in a more concentrated and overwhelming manner to systematically destroy vital N Vietnamese infrastructure (airfields, port facilities, bridges, roads, railways, manufacturing centres, etc) around Hanoi and Haiphong, at an earlier point than Op LINEBACKER in 1971-72, then US firepower would've proven decisive in compelling the Communists to rethink their objectives. Another instance illustrating how US airpower could've been more effectively utilised was where, in the post-US withdrawal and Vietnamisation phase of the war, the US could've continued providing effective round-the-clock B-52 air support for the ARVN to repel NVA all-arms attacks, as occurred in the 1973 battles.

US warfighting strategy and tactics are further scrutinised and critiqued, where Walton recommends that MACV should've been more organised and systematic in its chain-of-command and techniques utilised. MACV in OTL never developed a unified command structure, and US combat formations in the field were deployed to concentrate overwhelmingly on conventional-style search-and-destroy missions to hunt and kill VC and NVA forces, at the expense of other focuses, esp. the 'Hearts and Minds' campaign among the South Vietnamese civilian population. Walton outlines how such initiatives as the USMC's Civil Action Program (CAP) to secure and protect villages along the coast from Communist infiltration, and the Special Forces' assistance programs provided for hill tribes in the Central Highlands, were never followed up to a greater extent. He also critiques the deficiencies in the US armed forces 12-month rotation policy which impeded military efficiency and unit cohesion, instead recommending an 18-mth tour for individual soldiers sent to Vietnam, which would've provided American combat formations with a greater degree of experience and expertise from seasoned soldiers and Marines who'd already spent time incountry, instead of relying on newbies freshly sent in, who had to start from scratch. Had these initiatives and changes been employed ATL, then US strategy to win the war would've been more effective at both the strategic and tactical levels.

The book stipulates that US material and political support for South Vietnam should've been more co-ordinated and determined, instead of dismissing the Saigon regime as irredeemably corrupt and incompetent. The provision of US arms and munitions should've at least balanced the heavy level of Soviet support provided to the NVA throughout the conflict, esp. after the crucial Vietnamisation phase in 1972-75, which would've enabled the ARVN, fully equipped with the best American weapons and equipment, to adequately repel the NVA (in OTL, the ARVN actually acquitted itself well as a whole in defending the South from full-scale NVA attacks during 1972-73), instead of failing to provide the necessary continuous flow of equipment needed as happened OTL.

IMO, this book provides an excellent account of what could've been in Vietnam, and how the US, instead of being bound by the traditional discourse of inevitable unwinnability, could've actively taken steps to win the war which, with greater determination, co-ordination, and foresight, could've well resulted in US victory in Vietnam.

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