|
Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM |
|
|
Join Writer Development Section Writer Development Member Section
This Day in Alternate History Blog
|
Saddam
Dies In 1982 While
browsing, I came across the following article on the Shiite terrorist al Dawaa
movement. "In
July 1982, it carried out a daring attempt to kill Saddam Hussein near the town
of Dujayl, resulting in fierce gun battles between Baathist security personnel
and al-Daawa fighters that left 150 dead" Seems
to me to be a decent POD, so here goes: By July 1982, Iraq
had just emerged out of a series of defeats culminating in the Iranian retaking
of Khorramshar, a series in which Iraq had taken some 55-75.000 casualties.
Those losses also finally brought the point home to the Iraqi leadership
that the tactics used until now (defending strong points rather than deep,
layered defences) weren’t cutting it. 14
generals were executed to REALLY bring home the point. At the same time,
June had seen a purge of the Iraqi leadership that should have removed any
would-be opposition to Saddam Hussein. While
it was designed to aid Saddam, it will likewise aid Saddam’s clan in retaining
a hold on power. There doesn’t to
me seem to be any independent group able to challenge them on it.
Given the youth of Saddam’s sons, it is more likely that some of his
brothers/half-brothers will take over. Little
is known to me about their ideas, but it seems reasonable that they will be more
tribal (as opposed to political), less Baath, less disposed to dreaming about a
greater Iraq, and thus less disposed to attack neighbouring states. Which brings me to
the point about whether they make it through the war with Iran to actually be in
a position to think about such things. OTL, Iran threw a
series of three large-scale attacks at the Iraqi lines during July and early
August 1982. All failed, with the
Iranians suffering massive losses as they ran into the new defensive Iraqi
setup. This is also due to less
sophisticated Iranian tactics, since the Pasdaran and Basij took the honour of
being the ones defeating Iraq earlier in the year, while the regular armed
forces were subjected to renewed purges. Essentially,
the Iranian leadership decided on merely launching human war-attacks rather than
the combined arms-operations that had worked so well in the spring. So the question is,
whether the Iraqi armed forces instead buckle under the pressure of Iranian
attacks if Saddam Hussein suddenly is assassinated. I'd say no. Saddam had only been
officially in power for 3 years, so it is unlikely that the people as such will
have much of an attachment to him. Likewise,
the large-scale desertions of Iraqi soldiers when in Iranian territory shrank to
a trickle when the troops were back in Iraq, indicating they fought more out of
nationalism than love for Saddam. Saddam’s
death would not change this. So I’m guessing the
war actually proceeds much like OTL for the first couple years after Saddam’s
death. There is a slight
possibility that the Iranians are willing to give Iraq a peace-deal when Saddam
is dead, but the additional demands put upon such a deal by the Iranians (100bn
in reparations, for ex) make this unlikely. Maybe a few negotiations, but
nothing more. Thing begin to get
interesting by 1985, though. By then, there is bound to have been some sort of
infighting between the Tikritis that took over from Saddam – dictatorships are
not that conductive to collective leadership, so someone is bound to come out on
top. That gives arm-space for the
military leaders to act a bit more independently, as long as they don’t
present a challenge to the Tikritis. It
is bound to come anyway, but until then there is the possibility of more active
Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi army (and
equivalents) generally managed to field as many men as their Iranian
adversaries. At the same time, they outnumbered them royally in most types of
armaments, and surely in quality. I’m guessing that,
freed from Saddam’s ban on offensive moves (out of fear that those would bring
large-scale losses, and thus civilian unrest with them), the Iraqi army will be
switching to limited offensive moves by 1985, and more large-scale ones by 1986
and 87. They will not be as
spectacular as the 1988 ones, but will be enough to let the Iraqi leaders allow
more to happen. And without doubt,
they will inflict larger losses on the Iranian forces than these suffered OTL.
That again means Iranian morale begins to collapse earlier than it did OTL in
1987 (the actual collapse only came in 1988, but recruiting began dragging
mightily in 87). In short, I’m
guessing that the war comes to an end in 1987 rather than 1988.
As such that might not mean much, but it gives Iraq a year before her
resources are depleted, and she is thus in a much improved position to exact
terms on Iran. The rapprochement
between the USSR and USA hasn’t progressed as much as OTL, either, meaning the
UN is likely to be somewhat less effective in pushing through a cease-fire.
Finally, under such a scenario, it is unlikely that the US manages to
become as involved on the naval side as it did OTL. And without US
involvement and the downing of an airbus, the mullahs in Iran don’t have the
fig-leaf they had OTL to give in and sue for peace. Iraq can thus
continue pushing east until it seizes the oilfields in Arabistan/Khuzestan. Even
if the mullahs don’t want to, they will have to give in when their supply of
cheap money to buy guns for runs out. At the same time,
Iraq is able to exact very favourable terms for itself. At least Iranian
recognition of the Algiers accords, maybe even Iranian recognition of Iraqi
ownership of the Shatt al Arab. Iran could further be bullied into hand over Aby
Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb (occupied by Iran since the 70s) to the UAE. Who knows, if
negotiations drag out, there is the spectre of revolts by various nationalities
in Iran when the central government doesn’t have oil money to dispense.
You could have a greater Azerbaijan when the USSR dissolves, for ex. While there is no
possibility the world is going to go along with Iraq sitting on the formerly
Iranian oil outright, there is the possibility of the creation of an Iraqi
puppet, now that the non-Arab population of Arabistan/Khuzestan has been driven
out by warfare. While Iran thus
descends into chaos and obscurity, Iraq prospers. Not only is the war over one
year short, the UAE for ex can be obliged to cut large parts of the debt Iraq
has to her in exchange for the three mentioned islands. A good deal of formerly
Iranian oil money can probably be counted on to be smuggled into Iraq, too. In short, there is no
reason for Iraq to invade Kuwait in 1990. That also means there
is no direct US involvement in the Gulf, and that Iraq can sit back and begin to
act the hegemon of the Gulf. Without
anti-US moves, she might end up being just what Saddam wanted her to be: the US´s
local bullyboy. Regionally, it is
likely that the Israeli-PLO peace deal comes about anyway – the drift towards
that sort of an agreement began for the PLO already in the mid-80s, though the
OTL debacle of Palestinian support for Saddam after the invasion of Kuwait aided
greatly. With control (direct
or indirect) over Arabistan/Khuzestan, there is little need for Iraq to do much
of anything but sit back and heap in oil dollars. Even the Kurds can be bought off rather than gassed to death.
By 2004, we have a
wealthy, developed country in the middle of the Middle East.
Times are great, society being more and more westernized.
The main change to
OTL might very well be that Afghanistan is not the only failed state close to
Central Asia. Rump Iran could very
well develop that way, too. We
would see not only al Qaida, but a global version of Hezbollah, too (aside OTL
Hezbollah terror operations in Saudi Arabia, Spain and Argentina, for ex). Think, for ex, a
Shiite version of 911.
|
