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This Day in Alternate History Blog
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We
Didn’t Start The Fire:
The Quebec Rebellion, 1970-74
By Chris Oakley Part 4
inspired by the essay "Another Savage War Of Peace" by Sean M. Maloney, the short story "The October Crisis" by Edo van Belkom,and the novel Killing Ground:The Canadian Civil War by Ellis Powe One might have thought that the surge of popular anger over the brutalities perpetrated against civilians in the attack on Kearns would have prompted the FLQ to rethink its tactics in its struggle to gain Quebec’s independence from the rest of Canada. Instead, it only seemed to make the insurgents more willing to resort to such barbaric tactics. Their twisted logic was that if so many people deemed their attacks on civilian targets immoral, then they must be succeeding in their efforts to make Quebec a separate nation. Having inflicted heavy casualties on civilians and federal authorities at Kearns, the rebels next set their sights on a much bigger target: the city of Sherbrooke. Surpassed only by Montreal and Quebec City in terms of importance to the citizens of Quebec, Sherbrooke was viewed by the insurgents as the perfect laboratory for testing their plans to further escalate a war that had already been highly violent in the first place. The first target for their bombing campaign was the Sherbrooke branch offices of the Bank of Canada. In the eyes of the insurgents,
the Bank of Canada represented all the worst elements of 20th century predatory Anglo-Canadian capitalism, and to those masterminding the bomb attacks its offices seemed like the perfect place to launch their assault. If the bank bombing were successful, the FLQ insurgents would follow it up with a similar attack directed against the city’s main RCMP station. There were also plans in the works to assassinate the The architects of the planned bomb attack on Sherbrooke’s Bank of Canada branch had a surprising inside man to help them with their raid: a security guard who worked the bank’s morning shift. Embittered by what he considered a lack of respect on his employers’ part and a humiliating demotion the month before, this guard was a highly willing accomplice to the insurgents’ bomb plot-- albeit more for personal reasons than ideological ones. By his own account of his first encounter with the guerrillas, the war to separate Quebec from the rest of Canada was largely an abstract matter for him. He was more interested in exacting payback on his superiors for imagined past slights than in advancing the FLQ’s agenda; subsequent RCMP and QPP interviews with his co-workers described the man as having been largely apolitical before he got involved with the Sherbrooke bombing The conspirators spent all of May and much of the first half of June of 1971 getting things ready for their initial attack. Two of the conspirators worked at a building demolition company, which made it easy for them to obtain the necessary explosives for the attack and subsequent bombings. Another conspirator was a taxi driver before he joined the insurgency and therefore knew all of the quickest routes to Finally, on the morning of June 14th, the FLQ insurgents were ready to begin their terror bombing campaign. At around 9:00 AM local time, That afternoon the FLQ released a two-page typewritten statement boasting about the bank bomb attack and promising further such attacks throughout Quebec unless and until the Trudeau administration over in Ottawa capitulated to their demand for an independent Quebecois state. The government responded to this with its own press statement pledging to hunt down the bombers to the last man; by nightfall RCMP detectives were combing Quebec and parts of Ontario for any possible leads on the bombers’ whereabouts. In Washington, the Canadian embassy to the U.S. requested assistance from the FBI after provincial and federal police uncovered evidence suggesting the bombers might have had some measure of material support from sympathizers living in the Great Lakes or New England regions. There was even a brief investigation by Canadian intelligence agents into the theory that the bombers had joined forces with rogue elements of the KGB to secure additional equipment for their terror campaign against the Trudeau government. This theory was quickly put This cautiousness frustrated junior KGB officers in North America no end, to say nothing of the displeasure it aroused among dedicated Marxists within the FLQ. Part of the raison d'être behind the bombing campaign had been to inspire the Soviets to lend their weight to the cause of Québeçois independence by showing the FLQ insurgency was able to wage the kind of no-holds-barred partisan warfare which the Soviets themselves had practiced so well during World War II. Yet Moscow stood aloof from the bombers.... ****** ...and not just because of Andropov’s doubts as to whether the FLQ uprising could succeed in achieving its goal of an independent Quebec. The Kremlin was genuinely and deeply worried that if word got out the Soviet Union was backing the FLQ Canada’s chief foreign ally, the United States, might retaliate by giving financial and political support to dissident groups in Soviet-controlled eastern Europe or reviving the defunct JFK-era CIA campaign to overthrow Fidel Castro’s regime in Cuba. And that, Andropov’s cronies agreed, was a nightmare to be avoided at all costs. Those concerns didn’t stop Radio Moscow from relentlessly blaring out pro-FLQ propaganda on its English-language broadcast service as a way of needling both Canada and the United States. Interviews with FLQ partisans, surreptitiously recorded within rebel-controlled sectors of Quebec, were also aired over the network. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation countered these broadsides with its own propaganda blitz Emphasizing the repressive nature of Communism and the atrocities the FLQ had committed thus far since launching their uprising against the Trudeau government. On June 17th, three days after the Sherbrooke bank bombing, the bombers struck again. This time their intended target was the Circuit raceway in the town of Trois Rivières, a popular gathering spot for local auto racing enthusiasts. But in marked contrast to the deadly effectiveness of their bank raid in Sherbrooke, their attack on the Circuit was a failure...and a conspicuous failure to boot: one of the would-be bombers was literally caught in the act of trying to plant an explosive charge near one of the raceway’s fuel storage tanks. All the FLQ succeeded in accomplishing on this occasion was to make themselves into temporary laughingstocks and to get three of their most skilled guerrilla fighters arrested the by RCMP, who wasted little time moving the prisoners to a secure location to begin questioning them about the details of the FLQ’s bombing campaign. The prisoners held firm for more than four days, during which time their comrades-in-arms bombed newspaper offices in the Montreal suburb Just before midnight on June 26th, the first of the detainees in the failed Circuit raceway attack finally caved in and began to talk to police about what he knew regarding the bombing campaign. Within a matter of hours his two fellow detainees were also making confessions to police interrogators; armed with the information obtained from the three prisoners, the RCMP began to hunt down the remaining members of ****** The events of July 1st, 1971 spelled the beginning of the end for the FLQ’s terror bombing operation-- though few people on either side of the Quebec Rebellion would have dared to suggest so at the time. It was Canada Day, and in spite of the violence the FLQ’s insurgency had brought to Quebec substantial crowds were still turning out at public events in la belle province to mark the occasion. One of those events had been targeted by the FLQ for its latest terror bombing....but in the end the only casualties of the intended attack would turn out to be the bombers themselves and their leader, the legendary figure known as “Commandant Vert”(Commander Green). Even by the brutal standards of the Quebec Rebellion, CommandantVert-- also known to Quebec provincial police and the RCMP as Serge Dubonnet --was a singularly vicious man. And Dubonnet didn’t restrict his viciousness to his perceived enemy in combat: papers captured by Canadian Defense Forces units near the end of the Rebellion revealed he had once slit a fellow insurgent’s throat simply because the man in question had made a critical comment about his hairstyle. He also shot an unarmed civilian in cold blood during a holdup attempt gone awry. July 1st, 1971 marked the 104th annual observance of Canada Day; with that in mind, Commandant Vert decided the time had come for his cell to strike right at the heart of the mainstream Anglo Canadian society he so roundly despised. It was a decision that would end up costing not only his own life but also the lives of at least three of his fellow guerrillas. His plan was to set off a bomb in the crowd at Sherbrooke’s annual Canada Day parade, preferably at the point where said crowd would be most densely packed. The chain of events that led to his death has been reconstructed partly with the aid of the sole survivor of the explosion, a then-27 year-old recruit to the cause who was sitting in the main bedroom of Vert’s safe house when the bomb Vert was planning to detonate at the parade instead went off prematurely inside Vert’s own kitchen. “I was reading a map of the parade route,” the survivor told police shortly after he was pulled out of the rubble of the safe house, “when I felt a burst of hot air slamming into my back and I crashed to the floor as if somebody had clubbed me over the head. Before I could get up again a piece of the bedroom wall fell on top of me and I was trapped....the next thing I knew I could smell smoke coming from the kitchen, and at that second I realized the bomb must have exploded.” An examination of the ruins of the safe house by local and provincial police and evidence recovered from the epicenter of the blast by Sherbrooke fire brigade arson investigators led authorities to conclude that the explosion must have been primarily the result of a fuse in the bomb being improperly set. There was also speculation spontaneous combustion might have been a factor as well, given that the chemicals used in producing the bomb were extremely volatile. One Sherbrooke fire official candidly told a CBC News correspondent: “It’s a wonder the whole damn neighborhood didn’t go up in smoke.” The collapse of Commander Vert’s parade bomb plot, combined with the death of Vert himself and the leaks about the rest of the FLQ’s terror bombing conspiracy as a result of the Circuit raceway fiasco, prompted the FLQ’s top military leaders to pull the plug on the Sherbrooke bombing campaign. After one final bomb attack, made on July 7th against the Sherbrooke bureau offices of the MontrealGazette, the FLQ abandoned any further plans for bombing in attacks in the Sherbrooke area. Some say the FLQ lost its guerrilla war with the Trudeau government right then and there; certainly it had lost a significant battle.... To Be Continued For much of the Quebec Rebellion, robbery was a common means of raising funds for FLQ insurgent groups; Commandant Vert’s cell was particularly enthusiastic in the use of this tactic.
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