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HOW MUSSOLINI WON THE WAR

 

By Giovanni Spinella

The following AH can only be put in the [Alien Space Bats] category as it’s predicated on one central divergence: Benito Mussolini having a moment of clarity and suddenly seeing himself and Italy in 1935 for what it really was, as opposed to what he wanted to see. From this divergence, I traced an AH that I feel could have happened. I’ve embellished it somewhat, and I’ve added a few details that would have been remote at best, but not entirely implausible. Discovery of oil in Libya was as much a matter of luck as anything else. Mussolini was counting on Italians in South America to populate the enlarged Italian colonial empire. Once this didn’t occur and another source of manpower presented itself, it wouldn’t have been an impossible for events to go the way I’ve depicted them. Likewise the Regime in Italy did have a few (very few) valid men and there were capable administrators and functionaries that emerged despite the Fascists’ best efforts. Fascism itself was by no means a monolithic reality, but contained within itself a myriad of positions that went from reactionary nationalism to out and out communism: structuring these internal diversions into a more formal framework wouldn’t have been unheard of, and reflects the divisions and internal structure the Italian Christian Democrats gave themselves a few years later.

Finally, as for the war itself, with Italy initially neutral, Germany would have been in a better position to take on the Soviet Union, without having to open a half-dozen additional fronts for the Wehrmacht. Likewise, once Italy entered on the side of the Allies, having a semi-decent (as opposed to OTL laughable) military power on their side, and in a decisive strategic position, would have allowed the Allies to end the war that much sooner and probably helped most of Eastern Europe to avoid the long night of Soviet domination.

In the end this is Alternate History, more plausible then some, more unlikely then most, and predicated on one event, on one person who would have had to have been someone other then the small-minded and small-spirited despot he really was.

1. CLARITY

            It was sometime towards the end of 1935, watching a Wermacht parade in Berlin that Benito Mussolini realised that an alliance with Hitler was a bad idea.

            Seeing the mighty panzers rolling along the Wilhelmstrasse, the row after row of fierce and furious looking troops and the incessant buzz of the airplanes flying overhead, Benito suddenly realized Hitler was serious. He really wanted war, with the Russians, with the English and so very much with the French. And while Mussolini could enjoy the arrogant Gauls and the ever-so-insufferable English being knocked down a peg, he realized there was no way his beloved Italy would survive the conflict. At least, not without industries to match the Germans’ or the British.

            For the rest of his visit, Mussolini seemed all the more distracted, absorbed in thought. Hitler, who maintained a certain affection, indeed admiration for the Italian and his regime (his second father, he called Benito), was convinced it was emotion and awe, and if truth be told, Mussolini was in awe of what he had seen. But it was an awe of Germany, not so much the Nazi regime that currently ran it. The various Goebbles and Goerings strutted around in their uniforms and smiled at the Italian delegation with the sincere affection a toady gives his master’s favourite: paint-thin and easily removable.

The German generals however, behind their polite courtesy, couldn’t hide their contempt for the Italian military. Mussolini, who had reached power as much by judging men as anything else (luck being the other main ingredient, and just how much luck only he would ever truly know), saw behind the façade and seeing for a brief instant what he and his country must look like in their eyes, began to doubt. He asked himself if what they saw was true, if the appraisal of serious and efficient professionals was closer to the truth then whatever his own loyal Starace and mates believed il Duce wanted to hear.

Mussolini had stood there, on that Berlin balcony, for one instant of transfixed detachment, seeing himself and his surroundings, as he never had before, not for a very long time at least.

As his visit winded down to an end, he began to take his intuition on Hitler further. If Hitler really meant for war with the rest of the world, what about the rest of that twaddle in that unreadable book of his, his “Struggle”? What about all he had written about the Jews and the rest? Mussolini knew plenty of Jews, had loved a couple and a few Jews figured prominently in his regime. Did he really want those hinted-at and oh-so-subtle “solutions” for the Jews? Remembering the feel of Margherita Sarfatti’s skin as his hands had run down her body, the vivid intelligence and lusty passion of his own Queen of Sheba, as he called her, Mussolini found the answer.

He returned to Rome and called in a series of men he had pushed to the margins of the regime in the last couple of years: Dino Grandi, Italo Balbo and Giuseppe Bottai. He gathered them together and asked them: “Am I full of shit?”

Balbo, always impetuous and honest, answered: “Hell, yes! You’ve been listening to what those arse-lickers have been telling you, you’ve started to believe your own propaganda. You’re completely full of shit!”

Mussolini felt a certain irritation, as always, at Balbo’s manner, but he put it to one side. He contemplated his words instead and heard the truth in them.

While more diplomatically then their colleague, Grandi and Bottai both seemed to agree with Balbo’s assessment.

Mussolini nodded to himself. “Well then, he said, we’ll have to put matters right”.

 

2. THE SHIFT IN ALLIANCES

 

Over the next few months the Nazi hierarchy was distraught (and the Wermacht and Ministry of Foreign Affairs delighted) at the growing coolness and distance Mussolini and Fascist Italy began to put between their selves and Nazi Germany. Hitler’s passionate letters and proposals were met but polite but cooler and cooler replies. Fascism approved of much in the German Third Reich, but in the end Nazism, with its focus on race and blood, wasn’t Fascism, that was predicated on unity of all parts of the nation into one corporativistic whole, the only internal discriminant being loyalty to the Nation, the State and the Regime.

This didn’t prevent Mussolini’s foreign policy from at times walking close in line with the Germans’. Although Grandi was re-instated at the Farnesina, still il Duce had a very active role in foreign policy making. Italy completed her occupation of Ethiopia and weathered the weak sanctions the League of Nations invoked. Italy sent “volunteer” brigades into Spain to support Franco against the Republicans and the Communists.

But when push came to shove, Italy refused to sign any treaty more binding then non-aggression with Germany, signed in 1937. Hitler would have to face the world on his own, and while he despaired, the Germans military hierarchy rejoiced: they had vague ideas of what Hitler was intending but they knew whatever it was, it’d be easier with the Italians out of the picture. The High Command well remembered the admonishment of that Hungarian general: “I don’t know who will win the next war but I do know who’ll lose it: whomever has Italy on their side”. Mussolini also remembered that admonishment and chose to sit the impending war out.

 

3. DOMESTIC CHANGES

 

Domestically Mussolini began putting the nation through a series of changes that had been far too long delayed. Around Balbo and Grandi, a coterie of technocrats had begun to form, skilled and capable administrators, who had emerged almost despite the regime’s best efforts. With Starace losing more and more power and Farinacci being more and more isolated internally, there was an unforeseen window for men of talent, and not slavish devotion and adulation, to advance. It wouldn’t surprise Mussolini by now to learn that most of Italo’s men, “Italioti” they were called, were indeed anti-fascists.

The Italioti spearheaded a series of policies that suddenly shook up the atrophied Italian economy. The first was land reform, breaking the great landowners’ stranglehold on agriculture, especially in the south, and creating a series of agricultural co-operatives and businesses (ironically, this was one of the things the land-owners had used the Fascists in the 20s to oppose). Infrastructure also became a paramount concern, with highways, based on the model of the German autobahns and extended railways. There was even room for grandiose works: having followed the construction of the Golden Gate in California with rapt fascination, Mussolini insisted on constructing something similar in Italy. The Regime hired Jonathan Strauss to design and supervise the construction of the Messina-Reggio Calabria Bridge, called “Ponte dello Stretto” or “Ponte dell’Impero”. IN 1938 Strauss began the work and aided by some of his experienced workers, delivered a completed bridge by January 1942. Another work that began was the Mont Blanc tunnel in 1939, but this project was suspended due to the war and resumed in 1946

4. THE ITALIAN MILITARY: THE MINGHETTI AND RUILLET COMMISSIONS

Another sector of the Italian economy that Mussolini followed carefully was the military one. Having seen the efficiency of German tanks and planes, in 1936 Mussolini began a series of comparisons with the military of other nations. While the Italian navy was pretty good, the air force needed some serious redesigning (Balbo was a plane enthusiast and took over that sector very quickly). The army needed a complete overhaul: the weapons were old and decrepit, the command structure inefficient, the doctrines still set in 1918. Morale was brittle and the officer cadres ill prepared. Likewise provisioning was a joke.

What followed was a series of projects and plans that redefined the Italian military system forever more and dragged it kicking and screaming into the modern world. Bereft of any true military preparation, and for once truly aware of this, in September 1936 Mussolini delegated the task to a commission of experts lead by one Colonel Federico Minghetti. Minghetti had studied the militaries of various nations and had a series of ideas. He set up an office that was an analogue to the US Quartermaster General, its function being the procurement of all necessary supplies and provisions for the armed forces and the creation of stockpiles where necessary. He commissioned a series of projects and study groups with tight deadlines, developing all-terrain vehicles, studying the feasibility of auto gyres as a military vehicle, upgrading and modernising the tanks and artillery. The Minghetti Commission wasn’t above dirty tricks. IN 1939 they captured the proposals and designs by one British RAF Commander, Hibbert, involving the use of jet engines for airplanes. These plans received great attention by Balbo’s men and in 1940 the first prototype of jet fighter, the Fiat Dardo 01, flew over the skies of Libya. Mass production would follow in 1941. A prototype jet-bomber, the Macchi Tuono Alpha, rolled out in 1941 and the finished version, Alpha 1, was mass-produced after June 1942.

Meanwhile another group of analysts, lead by Colonel Fausto Ruillet, began studying modern military doctrines and tactics, testing them and comparing them. The Italian Army started adopting a novel training concept (for the Italians anyway): war games and manoeuvres, which were tried out either in Libya or in northeastern Italy. Many experimental tactics were practised in Spain, which effectively became the Italian Army’s unofficial training ground, with a higher number of units shipped into that civil war. Tactical applications were studied and evaluated rigorously. In one of the last joint Italo-German projects before the beginning of the war, German High Command staff and officers came in to act as advisors for the redefinition of Italian military doctrines. However the Italians didn’t want to copy the German model blindly: if nothing else that would make them vulnerable to Germany should war ever erupt between them. They therefore set up a similar project with the United States, whose military was greatly underestimated in Europe. Italian officers attended West Point and US officers visited Italian theatres. This joint Italo-American project was something of a surprise in the US, violating the American isolationism in all matters, not least of which military. However it was an important year in the US congressional elections and Roosevelt wanted to secure the Italian vote for the Democratic Party.

In a stroke of brilliance, Ruillet had German-lead and American-lead Italian units stage war games in Libya. One of the greatest ironies in history was that Erwin Rommel and George Patton “fought” each other amidst the dunes of Northern Africa in one such game in March 1939. Ruillet would manage to synthesise the divergent tactics and doctrines into a coherent whole in later years.

 

5. AFRICAN POLICIES

 

The Regime also began to intensify its works and endeavours in Africa. The colonies received intense and targeted intervention, with more and more land opened to agricultural utilisation, with geological surveys performed and minerary companies set up to exploit what resources were there. Hundreds of farmsteads were opened up in Libya, Somalia and Ethiopia to Italian settlers, and various fishing communities created along the Somali and Libyan coasts. Industries were set up, at first related to the agricultural needs (canning plants, for instance) and in later years extended to other sectors. Infrastructure was also set in place, with paved roads and a growing railway network. The Margherita-Mogadisciu line was inaugurated in 1940 and the Mogadisciu-Addis Abbeba-Asmara line was commenced in 1941.

Colonial surveys brought about, in 1939, the single most important discovery in Italian colonial history: the Libyan oilfields. Suddenly resource-poor Italy had a treasure-trove of unimaginable value. A Libyan oil-rush, not unlike the Texan rush of a few years before, began, with companies being set up by the cart-load all out to pump the oil and then process it in refineries established in Libya and Italy both.

Libyan oil triggered an important decision in Italian politics: in 1940 Libya was proclaimed part of Italy, like Algeria was with France. Unlike the French, however, Italy decided to extend the annexation not just to the land but to the people as well: the franchise of Italian citizenship was extended to a growing number of Libyans first, and then Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians. Mussolini made much of this policy, drawing parallels with Caracalla’s Edict of 214 a.D., that had extended Roman citizenship to the entire Empire. But if an analogy was to be drawn with Roman times, it was more along the lines of the axiom “Divide et Impera”, divide and conquer. By creating a vested interest in some native Africans for Italian rule, this would split the population and weaken any possible resurgent nationalism in the colonies, something the Italians had encountered in Libya and were still facing in Ethiopia.

 

6. ITALIAN “KULTURKAMPF”

 

The extension of citizenship to growing numbers of Africans was based on criterion of wealth, influence or service (all Eritrean Ascars could look to full citizenship at the end of their service, with pensions and land allocations as well). However, for these newly created citizens to become Italians, a cultural battle had to be fought. Public schooling, along the lines of the Gentile Reforms, was introduced to the colonies, not just for Europeans but for a growing number of natives as well. All children in the colonial cities, be they European or African, were expected to attend public schools. In the countryside, the children of influential natives were sat at the same desks as the children of the colonists and would study from the same texts. Scholarships were offered in greater and greater numbers to all deserving students and by 1944 the first native African doctors, engineers and lawyers appeared in Italian society. This was a one-sided cultural policy: natives were taught Italian history and language, with no room given to their own. Only in later years would this “cultural imbalance” be addressed.

The cultural and educational policies adopted for Africa raised another question: the policies to adopt with the vast number of Italians and their children scattered throughout the world, especially in the Americas. After a series of discussions, which involved Giuseppe Prezzolini and Gentile both, a framework was set up, with the creation of a series of Italian Institutes in all major cities in the Americas, which in turn would co-ordinate at a local level the kind of intervention required: sponsoring Italian-language papers and magazines, and later radio and television shows; creating evening courses that allowed those who wanted it to obtain equivalency certificates for any and all qualifications achieved abroad; and opening Italian schools with bi-lingual curricula. These policies were limited initially but would begin to receive massive attention after the war.

 

7. INTERNAL POLITICS: THE RISE OF CURRENTS AND THE END OF UNITY

 

The profound changes in the nature of the Regime had political repercussions. At the beginning of the 30s Mussolini had progressively pushed away any and all of the liberal and conservative elements and personalities in his government: Grandi had been removed from the Foreign Ministry and sent to be ambassador in England, Balbo had been sent to Libya and even Bottai had been progressively isolated. IN exchange, the sycophants, best represented by Achille Starace had won the party over, with their posturing, their theatrics and their rhetoric. These were men who had milked the “Fascist Revolution” for what it was worth and intended to continue to do so. In addition, the “corporativists” had gained ascendancy, firm believers in state intervention, but with none of the rigour and discipline that the French or the Germans applied. This had lead to the creation of a comprehensive welfare state but also to an economy that was suffocated under the thumb of cartels and protectionist policies.

With the return of Grandi and Balbo and the technocrats they nurtured and fostered, the regime shifted. Starace and his fellows found themselves losing power, local party potentates having to respond more and more firmly to central directives. In 1938 the UVI (Ufficio di Vigilanza Interna) was created, a party Internal Affairs division that oversaw the execution of Central Committee directives and began to investigate allegations of corruption. Grandi and Balbo’s followers were called “Italioti”, Starace’s supporters called themselves “Doctrinaires” a curious definition if one considers that there never was, nor would there ever be, a comprehensive and clear definition of Italian Fascist theory, beyond a few vague definitions and buzzwords. Starace’s Doctrinaires would fall in more and more with Farinacci and his “Purists”, reactionaries to the marrow and violently opposed to any and all concessions to greater liberty. On the internal left, Bombacci, the Communist-turned-Fascist organised the “Populars” which espoused a version of Fascism that had little to distinguish itself from out and out Communism. The Catholics in the Fascist Party were lead by Cavazzoni, a former Christian Democrat, and were called Clerical Fascists. Finally, although Mussolini kept himself formally above the internal squabbling, his son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano, formed a group called Praetorians, which defined itself as Mussolini loyalists, through and through. These groups, or “currents within the great Fascist sea” as Giovanni Gentile called them (or simply currents) effectively reproduced the pre-Fascist Italian parliament, only that everyone wore a black-shirt and they all called themselves Fascists.

The divisions within the National Fascist Party (PNF) became manifest when Mussolini pushed forward a change in the electoral law, effectively a return to the pre-1910 Giolitti-inspired proportionalistic reforms. A first-past-the-post system was re-introduced: only Fascists could participate, but more then one Fascist could run for office. As Bottai would later put it, with that law the supposed Fascist unity ended and the party effectively divided internally. IN terms of party member votes, the Praetorians got 30% of the vote, followed by the Populars at 25%. The Italioti got another 20%, the Doctrinaires and the Purists together got 15% and the Clerical Fascists 10%.

Still, many of Italy’s brightest minds refused to participate to the Regime, while they followed the turn of events with much interest. Men such as Einaudi, De Gasperi, Gramsci (from his “golden exile” on the Cote d’Azur), Sturzo, Treves, Modigliani, Prezzolini, Salvemini, still stayed at the margins of political life. They refused with varying degrees of horror the offers of party membership, although with this membership they could return to active politics. In some cases, this impasse was avoided by the king who, at the government’s proposal, appointed them life senators: Einaudi, Struzo, Prezzolini and Gramsci were thus nominated.

 

8. “OPEN DOOR” POLICY

 

Remembering his intuitions about Hitler and the Jews, Mussolini used the various Jews within the Fascist Party to set up an office that would favour immigration into the Italian Empire. An “open door” policy was adopted, and facilitations agreed with the Nazi government in early 1939 allowed a growing number of German and Austrian Jews to enter Italy and settle either in the mainland or, especially, in the colonies: Eritrea was destined to become one of the lands with the highest concentration of Jews outside of Palestine and Brooklyn. This integration wasn’t always easy: despite the reforms, the public works and the growing economy, Italy was still a relatively backwards nation, with a fragile infrastructure and a still small economy. The sudden influx of thousands of families caused strain and tensions, but the immigrants could count on an international network of support and aid that helped them front the cash necessary to buy houses, start businesses and buy farmsteads in Africa. The Jewish population was traditionally made of hard working and capable people, who managed more often then not to make the best out of any situation. Also a high proportion of these refugees and settlers were professionals, doctors, engineers, and chemists: men of knowledge and accomplishment. IN the field of Health and Sanitation, for instance, with the sudden influx of manpower, the Regime’s Health Ministry could start extending state-sponsored health cover to more and more people. Likewise many intellectuals began teaching in Italian universities, such as Karl Popper, destined to become a very influential person in Italian philosophy and politics and a senator of the realm. Another notable addition was Leo Slizard, who came to Italy in 1939 and joined Enrico Fermi in the Department of Metallurgical Studies in Milan’s Politecnico.

Inevitably the Italian government began to gain a growing prestige in the West: now not only conservatives and anti-communists sustained and admired the Fascist Regime but likewise a large segment of the Jewish public opinion did as well, and this wasn’t a painless process. Many Jews were devout anti-fascists and had participated in the opposition, such as Leo Valiani and Leo Ginzburg: for men such as they to approve the regime was a hardship indeed.

9. REFUGEES FROM THE EAST

 

The open door policy changed tone and nature after September 1939, the beginning of World War Two and Germany’s invasion of Poland. At this point, Germany began actively deporting Jews from Poland and Czechoslovakia towards Italy. IN exchange, Italy would sell more and more oil to the Germans. The English and the French would protest the Italians’ dealings with the Nazis but faced stiff internal opposition towards taking any further steps: the military commands of both nations didn’t want a war with Italy on top of the war with Germany (and a few politicians in those countries actually had believed Italy’s propaganda about her military capacity) and anyway Italy’s humanitarian aid to the millions of Jews ensured that no democracy could successfully “sell” a war with Mussolini’s regime. When Germany invaded Russia in 1941, the number of refugees increased all the more.

The mass deportations of refugees from Eastern Europe into Italy and her colonies put a strain on the nation’s infrastructure unseen before. Train after train of people would reach the old Austrian border, be collected by harassed Fascist party officials and put on other trains, taken to relocation camps in Southern Italy, or simply put on ships and sent straight to Ethiopia and Somalia. It would take the Italian bureaucracy months to process this massive onslaught of people and find a proper place for them, and in the meanwhile they had to feed and care for these refugees. As late as 1944 there were still refugees in the camps from 1939. After the war, a certain number of these refugees would eventually return to their former homelands, Germany, Austria, Poland, but considering the shape many of these nations took after the war, and many of the events that had taken place therein, the majority of refugees would either stay to eke out a life in the Italian colonies or eventually move to Israel and the US. By the end of the war, some eight million men, women and children would have settled in the Italian Empire.

 

10. UNIQUE IMMIGRANTS

 

It wasn’t just Jews: the Nazis used the agreements to funnel all their undesirables towards Italy. Gypsies, political dissidents, common criminals, and homosexuals, all were shipped south. This would present the Italian government with a series of posers and some odd remedies: the Gypsies were shipped en masse to Africa and thus was born the nation of African Roms. Common criminals were sent to penal colonies, once again in Africa, where they’d be allowed to “buy” women from the African natives and set up families. The homosexuals of both genders were interned in a series of camps in Sardinia, with their population reaching the number of 80,000 men and women. Male Homosexuality was a crime in Italy as well as most other nations, whereas female homosexuality wasn’t even contemplated by the law. Therefore the regime couldn’t just let these alleged criminals free: already Cavazzoni’s Clerical Fascists were beginning a campaign to save the morality of the youths. Still, the regime gradually adopted a policy of “don’t ask, don’t tell”. One by one, these homosexuals were found jobs (often in the arts and music) and would move off. All lesbians were released immediately (their sexual preferences weren’t contemplated by the Italian penal codes and therefore didn’t exist). A certain number however remained in the Sardinian camps for years, eventually turning the shacks and tents into a proper town and city. Named Arcadia, this city would become the unofficial gay capital of Europe, offering a safe-haven for homosexuals throughout the world. This city would have a stormy life but weather any hardship (native Sardinian hostility, recurring government homophobia, Catholic persecution).

After the war, another couple of million of eastern refugees would settle in Italy, fleeing the Soviets and others. A healthy Ukrainian community prospered in Somalia. Belarus and Great Russian neighbourhoods arose in most Italian cities and there was even a Baltic community in Eritrea (centuries old familiarity with the Jews rendered this choice easy).

 

11. THE MILAN CONFERENCE

 

IN 1938 the Fascist Regime had a chance to claim the spotlight for political reasons: Hitler has initiated an invasion of the Sudetenlands and the Anschluss in Austria, both acts prohibited by the Versailles Treaty. The Allies didn’t want a war, weren’t ready for one but they couldn’t let Germany’s acts of aggression go unanswered. Mussolini got the Allies out of the impasse by chairing a conference in Milan that ratified the German acts but obtained assurances from Germany that this would be the end of his expansionism. The Milan Conference was hailed by many as a masterpiece of political statesmanship by Mussolini and British PM Chamberlain could return to England having assured “peace in our time”. While the Allies and Germans were busy facing off over Central Europe, they had no objections to Italy claiming suzerainty over Albania, which was invaded and annexed in a text-book demonstration of efficiency and precision in early 1939.

 

12. THE SECOND WORLD WAR

 

IN September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, sparking off the Second World War. Poland collapsed in less then a month. England and France declared war on Germany and rushed their forces to the massive Maginot line. Hitler in 1940 ordered an invasion of Belgium and Holland and thus avoided the direct confrontation in Alsace and Lorraine. The Allies collapsed and France fell. It was during these hectic days that Mussolini seized the initiative: as the Germans took Paris and the French government tried to rally, Italian forces in Libya and Eritrea took Tunisia and Djibouti. Likewise a couple of Italian divisions marched into Savoy and took Nice, thus re-establishing the border at the 1859 lines.

Immediately Germany and England both wanted to know what were Italy’s intentions and the Regime quickly replied with a couple of messages, one to Germany, reaffirming the non-aggression treaty and Italy’s neutrality and another one hand delivered by Dino Grandi himself to the British government, in which Italy stated that the invasions of Tunisia and Djibouti were a “necessary act” to ensure the safety of maritime traffic in the Mediterranean and the Rea Sea both, whereas the “liberation” of Savoy and Nice was the solution to a decades-long controversy between Italy and France (Grandi didn’t mention that this “controversy” had been resolved some seventy years ago by mutual treaty; nor did the new-formed government under Winston Churchill choose to press the matter). After all, as the Italians put it to the English, with a new, pro-German government forming in France under Marshall Petain, did Churchill really want to risk these strategically important territories falling under Nazi control? And did the British really want to start a war with another nation while they were trying to fight a losing war with Germany? Churchill acquiesced to the Italians’ grab but couldn’t and wouldn’t hide his contempt for these actions.

 

13. ITALO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

 

Italy spent the next year accelerating her arms programs, while doing her best to integrate the ever-increasing numbers of refugees and colonists. A tacit entete began to form between Italy and the US, Mussolini’s actions receiving Roosevelt’s de facto blessings. US financial aide, both private, (from various philanthropic organisations out to help the Jewish and other eastern refugees) and government-backed, began to arrive copiously and was eagerly used by the Regime to increase military production and European settlement of Africa. Roosevelt hoped that Italy would be in a position to bring Germany and Britain to the treaty table. But if Hitler wouldn’t have minded such action from Italy, Churchill was a far different character from Chamberlain, had little faith in Mussolini’s politics and none whatsoever in Hitler’s. Germany and Britain would continue their war, with the US opening newer lines of credit to the British and Italy sitting on the sidelines.

 

14. THE YUGOSLAV CIVIL WAR

 

In 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The long gruelling war in east had begun. Initial German successes were remarkable. Leningrad fell in September of 1941 and the Germans reached Moscow, where began the legendary Siege that would last almost two years. While an alliance between Russia and Britain formed, and the US were being drawn ever more into the conflict, politically at least, Yugoslavia disintegrated into civil war (April 1941).

This war was triggered in no small part by Mussolini, who for years had been backing the Croatian Nationalists, amongst others. The various nationalities were at each other’s throats and the Karageorgevicz’ iron-fisted rule had proven ineffectual. It had been easy for Mussolini to trigger the civil war and, under the “peace-keeping” banner; Italian forces invaded the Balkan state. Serbian armed forces tried to resist, but the modernised and well-equipped Italian army managed to overwhelm them with an impressive display of American and German-learned tactics and logistics. Two forces, one from Friuli and one from Albania drove into the nation and soon had little to do but collect the mass desertions of Slovenian, Croatian, Albanian and Montenegrin troops. The Serb core fought well, forcing the Italians to sweat for their victories, but in the end the Italian army had better troops then the Serbian regular army. Belgrade fell May the 27th 1941.

The dismemberment of Yugoslavia became something of a Balkan Conference. Italy took Dalmatia, Slovenia (in a semi-autonomous status) and Kossovo (and other Albanian zones). Greece and Bulgaria each received chunks of Macedonia, while Rumania and Hungary got their own portions, such as Vojovdina. Three nations were set up, a Realm of Montenegro, a Croatian Republic (with most of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and a Republic of Serbia, which maintained its pre-1914 borders and got the Serbian parts of Bosnia as well. Italy pulled out of Serbia instantly, not wanting to be tied down in a war of occupation, and ensured all nations respected each other’s borders. Germany expected some compensation for her non-interference and received certain parts of northern Slovenia (but not South Tirol as requested).

Britain was increasingly hostile to Italy but the good relations Italy had built with English allies such as Greece became an ulterior block to any thought, on the British side, to take matters further. The United States were perplexed, even though Mussolini had wrapped his actions around the Wilsonian credo of self-determination of nations. However the enthusiasm the Italo-American community felt at Mussolini’s successes, and the perceived increased reflected prestige, were enough to convince Roosevelt to not take the matter further, although the United States would only recognise the dismemberment of Yugoslavia five years later. The Soviet Union had little love for Italy, but Stalin had a certain appreciation for Mussolini’s sudden ruthlessness and opportunism. Italy has managed to wiggle her way though her difficulties again. Indeed, by acting as guarantor for Bulgarian and Greek independence and neutrality, her prestige increased even further, at least outside of Whitehall…

 

15. THE USA ENTER THE WAR

 

The end of 1941 saw the Japanese attack Pearl Harbour and force America’s entry into the war. Hitler declared war on the USA as well, hoping in vain to get the Japanese to declare war on the Soviet Union. The Japanese knew the wisdom of not fighting two foes simultaneously and they were on the outs with the Germans due to the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact anyway.

1942 saw the USA building up its fleet and aviation. Britain became a major airstrip for increasing bombing campaigns on Europe: ironically, Britain’s greatest defensive asset, the Channel, was also the major hindrance for any offensive actions. American forces were raw and unproven while the morale of the British Army was at an all-time low: having been defeated repeatedly by then Germans and chased off the continent in 1940, the “Tommies” had lacked the opportunity to make up for their previous defeats. A certain number of divisions had been shifted into the Pacific Theatre, and defending India, and even a few American divisions had been moved halfway across the world into the South-East Asian theatre, but the Allies were unable to “mix it” so to speak, with the Germans.

Germany was also having difficulties of her own: while the initial offensive in Russia had been a success, still Moscow hadn’t fallen and served as a rallying point for the Soviet regime. The harsh Russian winter had caught the Germans unawares and had allowed the Soviets to stage a series of counterattacks that had weakened the Wermacht. And the disastrous policies followed by the Germans in the occupied territories effectively turned the vast expanse of Ukraine and Belarus and Great Russia into a seething pot of rebellion and anti-German partisan activity. A gradual war of attrition was forming in the East, a war Germany wasn’t prepared for.

 

16. ITALY’S RE-ARMAMENT

 

Italy’s re-armament proceeded at a break-neck pace. The Yugoslav campaign had seen the first successful use of jets and auto gyres (or helicopters) in battle. Indeed German and British observers both watched the Italian jets with great interest and both nations had accelerated their jet projects as a result, although Italian Air Force would maintain a certain practical superiority for the next couple of years, at least until the Anglo-Americans managed to build the two-man jet with radar. Italian observers in Russia had studied captured Soviet T-35 tanks and sent the diagrams and designs to Minghetti’s Commission, who promptly began phasing in the new models (but only a limited number would have been deployed by the end of the war).

 

 

17. THE DEBATE TO ENTER THE WAR

 

1942 was the year in which political discussions in Italy centred on whether or not to enter the war and on whose side. The debate had echoes of the 1914-1915 discussions that lead to Italy entering the war alongside the Triple Entete. A certain faction, lead by the Catholics, wanted to stay out of the war. Farinacci’s Purists wanted to resume the alliance with Germany that had seemed in the cards in ’36. The other currents all wanted to enter the war alongside the Allies: the Praetorians to cement Mussolini and Italy’s prestige; the Populars to side with the homeland of international socialism (the USSR); the Italioti because they wanted international ratification of Italy’s conquests and wanted to anchor the nation to the West. Talks had begun with the Allies in June of 1942. By that month, Italy was in a state of full mobilisation and many refugees were suddenly equipped with uniforms and rifles (indeed there was a certain number of veterans amongst the refugee population and officers in particular were approached and recruited quickly). The Allies began to land troops in North Africa, taking Morocco and Algeria where the Free French government under Charles De Gaulle formed. German intelligence suspected the Allies would attempt a landing in Southern France, which made little sense, as the Channel would have been easier. However the failed landing at Dieppe still figured heavily in the belligerents’ minds and alternative ways to open the Second Front (that Stalin constantly clamoured for) had been studied. The Germans hadn’t ignored Italy and had indeed quietly begun mobilising reserve divisions along the Alps but assumed that Mussolini would wisely site the conflict out. This conviction was tinged with just the slightest shade of concern: the reformed Italian Army had performed quite admirably in the Balkans and the military auto gyres had impressed the High Command considerably. Adding the Italian Dardos and Tuonos to the equation made Italy a harder nut to crack then at any previous time in the last ten years. Ruillet, Minghetti and the other officers of the newly reformed Italian HQ on the other hand, feared greatly that their forces would be unprepared to fight the impressive German Wermacht.

Nevertheless the eyes of the world were pointed to Italy: if the Italians joined the Allies, they would suddenly have a strategically priceless base for operations, allowing them to take the war onto German soil. If the Italians sided with the Germans, the Allies would stage an invasion of the mainland. Finally, were the Italians to sit the war out, the Allies intended on moving their forces across Africa and the Mid East, pouring into the Caucasus and from there engage the Germans alongside the Russians: this latter was the battle plan that was most feared by the American and British. Such a plan would be a logistical nightmare, with tenuous supply lines and a dependence on the most unreliable of Allies, Stalin.

 

18. NEGOTIOATIONS WITH THE ALLIES. THE TREATY OF ALGIERS

 

IN the night between the 4th and the 5th of June, Mussolini decided to side with the Allies. Grandi and Balbo, along with Ruillet and Minghetti, had all explained both Italian vulnerability to the Allies and the political and economic benefits of an alliance with the Americans. Mussolini was convinced, but it was now a question of convincing the Allies.

The good relations between the USA and Italy were a promising starting point. Dino Grandi had visited Washington repeatedly between 1941 and 1942 and had established some important contacts with men such as Secretary of State Dulles. However anti-Italian hostility was high in London (Churchill called Italy a “despicable nest of opportunistic vipers”) and was rabid amongst the French (who had already intimated their intentions of reclaiming their lost territories from Italy at the end of the war). The USSR, at this stage, was not involved in the talks but Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy had traditionally good relations (Italy was one of the first western powers, and the first of the victors of WWI, to recognise the USSR).

Mussolini was finding himself almost having to pitch a sale, selling the validity of Italy as an ally to the West. Such a situation was intolerable and Italy rapidly pulled out of the informal talks, which were starting. Roosevelt therefore had to exert all of his influence and power to get the British and the French back at the dealing table. Mussolini’s demands were straightforward: ratification of the new situation in the Balkans, with the dismemberment of Yugoslavia; acknowledgement of the Balkans as Italy’s “natural sphere of interest and influence”, with subsequent withdrawal of any and all British forces from Greece; ratification of Italy’s new western borders, with the “liberation” of Savoy and Nice; formal cession of Tunisia and Djibouti from France to Italy and further territorial concessions including British Somaland, a joint Anglo-Italian mandate for Sudan, and an Italian mandate in Cyprus and Yemen.

These terms, while not cheap, weren’t even outrageous. It did mean however that France and Britain would have to accept Italy’s actions and overall “make place” for the Italian regime in the concert of Powers. In the eyes of many, it seemed like a reward for cowardice and betrayal, however Roosevelt pointed out that there was little in the Italian demands that Mussolini’s regime hadn’t already taken or couldn’t take anyway. Churchill finally acquiesced but De Gaulle refused to even discuss Italian terms. His intransigence however was weakening his position both with the Allies and within Free France. Roosevelt loathed the French General and would love to dismiss him from the Allies’ inner circles. Suddenly Italy’s entrance into the war became the pretext for a showdown between De Gaulle and Roosevelt, one that De Gaulle knew he would loose. He therefore backed down, “showing throat”, so to speak at the Americans. He would never forget this episode however.

Finally, in December of 1942, Italy signed the Treaty of Algiers and formally joined the ally camp. A declaration of war against Germany was postponed until March 1943, when the Alps would once again be passable. When the day came, March 28th 1943, Italy declared war on the Third Reich and entered the fray.

 

19. ITALY AT WAR

 

            While Germany wasn’t taken completely by surprise by the Italian declaration, nevertheless the defensive shift and repositioning of forces was only half completed by the time Italy entered the war. As a result, initial Italian gains were remarkable: after some hard fighting near Innbruck, this city, and all of Tirol, feel to Italian forces the 4th of April 1943. As Allied troops and tanks rolled up the “boot” and reached the north-east, the siege for Vienna began, lasting some two weeks before finally falling to Italo-Allied divisions. Hungary rapidly sued for peace and put herself under Italian protection (the thought of ending under the Russian heel was horrifying for Budapest). The German counter-attack managed to halt the Allied advance temporarily.

            Meanwhile a second front was opened in France which, spearheaded by De Gaulle, opened up the nation to the advancing Allied armies. Allied troops invaded via Provence and climbed northwards. The Vichy regime crumbled and collapsed overnight but German forces in the north put up a stiff resistance.

            Germany suddenly found herself beset on three fronts, a situation the German High Command had feared ever since 1918. This situation was rendered all the worse when the Allies achieved a second western European front with a landing in Normandy (June 1943). Strategic reserves were called in to arrange a defensive perimeter of the Great Reich while Hitler considered his options.

            With a rapidly deteriorating western front and new southern front, the German armies in the East suddenly acquired new importance. Soviet counterattacks had begun ever so slowly to push the Wehrmacht back, the Siege of Moscow was lifted in July 1943 and Hitler agreed to recommendations to withdraw the German armies along a defensive eastern perimeter that still included the Baltic states, Belarus and most of Ukraine. Front-line Soviet forces, expecting a long and hard campaign were surprised by the speed and efficiency of German retreat. IN doing so they committed a few serious blunders: in attempting to press the German retreat and try to turn it into a rout, several Soviet armies had overextended themselves, thus allowing the Germans, in a series of blistering strikes, to shatter them. It was, in many ways, a modern variant of the tactics the Mongol cavalry had used centuries before and Marshal Zhukov almost answered with his head for that. Still, as a result of the German withdrawal and counter-strikes, the Red Army was in a state of disorganisation for a couple of months and would be unable to invest the German perimeter until winter of that year. This also allowed the Germans to arm anti-Soviet resistance in the Ukraine which would hamper significantly Soviet advance until 1945, thus, allowing Rumania and Slovacchia to make their separate peace with the Allies.

           

20. GERMANY SURROUNDED

 

            By September 1943, Germany’s position was clearly becoming more and more untenable. While the nation arranged itself for a defensive war, political tension between the factions of the Reich erupted and reached the danger-level: the hostility between Army and the SS, always present, now rose to fever pitch. Wehrmacht officers were constantly filing reports of SS atrocities against the civilian populations, pointing out how this behaviour had effectively cost them most of the Eastern front. This situation of tension became all the more dramatic when the SS, on verbal orders from Hitler himself, began to initiate the so-called “Final Solution” against that part of the Jewish and other “undesirable” population that still hadn’t been deported to Italy. These people, some one million all together, were rounded up in concentration camps and brutally killed in an event called the Holocaust which blackens German and Eastern European consciences to this day.

            The battle between the Party and the Army reached such levels of intensity that in some parts of Belarus open fighting broke out between SS and soldiers (over the issue of the disposal of some civilian prisoners).

           

21. DIVISINS IN THE ALLIED CAMP. THE CONFERENCE OF ATHENS.

 

At the same time, the Allied camp was divided as well. Whereas Roosevelt and Stalin for different reasons both advocated the unconditional surrender of Germany, Britain and Italy had reasons to oppose it, not least the reluctance, to say the least, to allow the Russians free reign in Eastern Europe. In January of 1944 a summit was held by the Allies in Athens, where Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and Mussolini discussed the future disposition of Europe. Due to their enviable position, thanks to Italy’s intervention, the Allies directly or indirectly controlled most of Eastern Europe: Greece and Bulgaria had remained outside the war and were therefore excluded from any geopolitical division of the continent (and Italy had appointed herself guarantor of their independence). Hungary was a battlefield between Axis and Allies but the legitimate Hungarian government of Admiral Horthy had surrendered to the Italians. Rumania was still in the Axis camp, as was Slovacchia, but both governments had advanced “feelers” to Italy and Britain both, desperate to avoid Russian domination. Stalin was therefore very much aware that his bargaining position was weak: at best the Soviet Union could hope for its 1940 borders, with the parts of Poland it had taken in 1939 and the Baltic Republics and the chunk of Finland taken after the Winter War. However, Stalin insisted on recognition of these borders, and withheld recognition of the new arrangement in the former Yugoslavia until these conditions were met. Likewise the Soviets insisted on safe borders, something the pre-1939 arrangement had been unable to secure. Paramount in the consideration of all was the future of Germany.

 

22. THE RE-BIRTH OF THE AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

 

            With a diffident air, Dino Grandi put forward a proposal that Mussolini adopted and presented to the Allies: the recreation of the Austrian Empire. Churchill had long expressed his regret at the disappearance of this ancient institution and had also pointed out that bereft of rule from Austria, the central European states would inevitably gravitate to Germany. Grandi had remembered these statements and put forward the argument that recreating a solid, democratic and federal state, comprised of Austria, the former Czechoslovacchia, Hungary and those parts of Rumania that had belonged to the Empire before 1918 could act as a natural container for these people, who had all, one way or the other, failed at their brief independence. The reformed Empire would also act as a buffer between Russia and Germany. Objections to this proposal centred on the twin aspects of anachronism of such an entity and the unwillingness of the nations involved to cede their sovereignty to the Hapsburgs yet again. Russia also pointed out that Austria-Hungary had historically been a neighbour only slightly less dangerous then the Germans. The Grandi Proposal might have died there and then, if Mussolini and Churchill, now working in concert (provoking Churchill to comment on the strange bedfellows of politics), hadn’t both expressed a liking for this arrangement, that would keep most of Central Europe free from the Bear and Hun alike. They therefore filtered news of these proposals to nations involved and hinted strongly that the alternative would be between a re-formed Austria and Soviet occupation. Presented with these options, the government of Hungary and the governments-in-exile of Czechoslovacchia and Austria approached Carl of Hapsburg, who was living in Switzerland at the time and offered him the figurative crown of a reformed Empire. This Empire would be federal, allowing for a strong internal autonomy of the member states, and would have a democratic government answerable to parliament: the Hapsburg monarchy would be a figurehead monarch only. Carl, seeing the fate of Central Europe in the balance, agreed to these proposals and the Reunification Declaration was proclaimed by the parties directly involved. The Rumanian government let it be known that it would be willing to “revisit” its borders in the interest of peace, but insisted that her independence from the Soviet Union be backed by all parties. Likewise the Slovacchian government, although a German protectorate, let it be known that it too would be willing to adhere to this arrangement. Italy and Britain were both amenable to this situation, Stalin was opposed and Roosevelt divided between the need to keep the Russians happy and the legitimate desire for freedom expressed by these nations, who were still nominally enemies.

 

23. THE DEATH OF ADOLPH HITLER

 

            As the Allies left Athens with a potential framework but many divisions, in February the 6th 1944 Adolph Hitler was assassinated by the German High Command.

            Hitler had become more and more irrational as time went by, his plans and designs of global domination crumbling around him. Many segments in the German government felt that some form of negotiation with the Allies for a conditional peace should be initiated, but Hitler refused to even contemplate it. The Italian government had put out a series of feelers to the High Command suggesting that Germany could possibly maintain her unity and sovereignty were the Nazi Party to be removed from the picture: certainly, Mussolini found the Soviet-American “unconditional surrender” policy to be ill-advised and self-serving.

            A plot to assassinate Hitler was formulated, with generals, industrialists and those surviving members of the civil government and Junker nobility that hadn’t been assimilated into the Nazi machine participating. Instead of bombs and elaborate rituals, a group of crack commandos, loyal to Germany alone, would assassinate the Fuhrer. This was executed with text-book efficiency but now opened new problems. A Provisional Government was formed under General Jodl, with Generals Rommel and Guderian backing him. The Nazi party, however, rejected this coup and lead by Himmler, tried to stage a counter-coup. What this caused was a civil war within Germany proper, Wehrmacht and SS finally and openly fighting each other. However, ironically enough, a tacit agreement was made to keep the German armies in the East out of the fight and keep them supplied. Von Paulus was told by both sides that his job was to make sure the Soviets didn’t break through and spoil the party. By now even the Nazis were aware the war couldn’t be won, but they could still influence how it would be lost. Not only, but the ill-advised statement by Mussolini, recognising Jodl’s government and calling for the dissolution and arrest of the Nazi party, effectively put Himmler, Bormann and Goering in a position where they were fighting for their lives, and therefore determined not to surrender. Britain kept silent, simply noting with joy the end of that criminal Hitler, while the US and USSR both reaffirmed their intent for the unconditional surrender of Germany.

            However, by now, even Roosevelt was aware that with Germany imminently out of the picture, the relations with the Soviet Union would acquire a central position in the US’ geo-political strategy. The Soviets wanted their say in the arrangement of Europe, but the nations involved wanted no such Russian voice. Communists and their sympathisers in the US tried to stage some rallies in support of the great Soviet democracy and a “fair deal for Moscow”, but all this did was solidify Roosevelt’s aversion for the Russian regime. With great clarity, Mussolini (under suggestions by all quarters, including Prezzolini, Croce, Balbo and Grandi) pointed out to Roosevelt that America would be central to any European policy and that the US would have to take up the burden of leadership of the “civilised world”: far better to do so with all of Europe behind her then part of it under the Soviet Bear. By now even Mussolini had accepted the British concerns over the Soviet Union and in his talks with many Eastern and Central European leaders, il Duce had been deeply impressed by the degree of fear of the Soviets that these peoples had. Mussolini was therefore the first Allied leader to openly speak of “containing Soviet ambitions in Europe”, where the Americans were still talking of balance and the British, while nodding at American words were trying to figure out how to check the Bear. This was another ill-advised statement by Mussolini, as it suddenly ignited Stalin’s paranoia and distrust of the West. Relations between the Soviets and the Allies cooled noticeably.

 

24. THE GERMAN WITHDRAWAL: THE BURNING OF POLAND

 

            In April of 1944, the Soviets won a decisive battle to the south-east of Minsk. The German eastern perimeter had been breached and it took all of Von Paulus’ skill to prevent an all-out collapse. The German army began a series of closely co-ordinated withdrawals, eventually opening up Belarus and the Baltics to the Soviets. Seeing the German army pull back, massive waves of refugees abandoned their homelands and began a long trek west. Many of these people would eventually find refuge in the Italian Empire or in the USA.  The German withdrawal adopted the Roman poisoned-land approach. Wells were poisoned, land was ruined and infrastructure wrecked. The Soviets would find very little in terms of fodder and victuals to sustain them in their advance (which in turn weakened their supply lines and allowed German commando teams and the Luftwaffe to harry them even further). Poland bore the brunt of this policy, with cities and towns emptied and people were either herded south to the Red Cross camps that were being formed in Italian occupied areas (some 5 million Poles would end up there), or they remained to effectively starve to death in their homelands (4 million Poles would die in the Spring-Summer of 1944 alone). Once Poland was crossed, by August 1944, parts of Eastern Prussia were also subject to the same fate. Indeed the entire city of Koeningsburg was effectively demolished and dismantled: all that was worth taking was taken and everything else wrecked.

The German Civil War was ending with the victory of the Army. Himmler was killed May the 17th and Goering committed suicide. The Western Front had begun to fall after the Allies had managed to unite the two expeditions, from the south and Normandy near Reims (February the 8th 1944).

 

25. GERMANY SURRENDERS

 

In September of 1944, Jodl made an address to the Allies that was a conditional surrender. Terms included surrender of all Nazi war-criminals to the Allies, the dismantling of most of the German war machine and withdrawal into the 1939 borders. War compensations would be made to all nations and Von Paulus offered himself to the Allies for his actions in Poland. Italy immediately accepted these terms and the next day Britain did so as well. The USA waited another day and finally came forward with a counter-proposal: Germany would allow Allied occupation and in exchange the Wermacht would be allowed to stay in arms. The Soviets would occupy the area east of the Oder-Niesse, the USA the area immediately to its west and the remaining part of Germany would be occupied by Italy, Britain and France. The Allies would dictate the future political arrangement for Germany, but ad interim Jodl’s government would exercise civil administration. Jodl agreed to these terms, aware that by doing so, he’d spare most of Germany Soviet occupation.

On October the 2nd 1944, Italo-American troops entered Berlin. One picture that would remain forever in the minds of the world was the Italian solider waving the Italian flag and the American G.I. waving the Star-Spangled Banner over the roofs of the Government (although the next day another such picture was taking to add the Union Jack, as the British had got there a day late). The Second World War in Europe was over.

 

26. JAPAN SURRENDERS

 

Hostilities still remained with Japan. However by September 1944, the Japanese army had been defeated on most of mainland Asia and only the Home Islands and Okinawa were still fighting. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan (as did Italy) but was having troubles shifting troops east: Stalin wanted to keep a strong force in Europe to give extra weight to the Soviet’s demands. The war in Asia ended when two atomic bombs were dropped on Okinawa (destroying the island forever) and Hiroshima respectively (October 16th and 18th 1944), thus crushing the Japanese will to fight. Japan sued for peace and surrendered to American occupation on October the 25th 1944.

 

27. THE ATOM BOMB

 

The Atom bomb had been a joint Italo-Anglo-American project: once the explosive capabilities of nuclear fission were theorised, studies had begun both in the US and Italy (and to a lesser degree in Britain and Germany): Italy could count on a group of physicists and theoreticians lead by Enrico Fermi and Leo Slizard, whereas the Americans had Albert Einstein and Eric Oppenheimer (amongst others). Once Italy had entered the war, the two projects had been merged, each side sharing their research. This allowed for a great acceleration in the production not just of the two bombs used in Japan but an arsenal of ten such devices, which meant that the Allies still had eight bombs at their disposal.

Stalin had wind of the Americans’ experiments, and the Italians’. Indeed he had managed to place a couple of operatives in the Italian project, but when the two groups had merged, his operatives had been unwittingly cut off from any further information. Such was his impression at the bombs that his designs for Europe were effectively quashed. Even when Soviet espionage managed to secure plans for these warheads in 1949, by then the situation in Europe had solidified.

 

28. THE TREATY OF VIENNA

 

The Treaty of Vienna of November 1944 set up the shape of Europe: Germany would be divided into five occupation areas, as would Berlin proper; the German juggernaut would be de-nazified (a process the civil war of ‘43’-’44 had already commenced), and while the SS would be handed over in block to the Allies as would individual Wehrmacht soldiers and officers guilty of specific war crimes (Von Paulus had consigned himself to the Russians as a gesture of good-will, one that would long be remembered in German fiction), the rest of the German army and Navy and airforces would be allowed to disband and return home. Germany would remain under Allied occupation for the foreseeable future, the Allies dictating the new order and political structure for the nation. The Austro-Hungarian Federal Empire was created, capital Vienna, under Emperor Karl the first of Hapsburg and comprising Austria (minus the Tirol, that Italy kept), Hungary, Czechoslovacchia and Transilvania. Yugoslavia ceased to exist and the constituent nations of Serbia, Croatia and the Kingdom of Montenegro recognised (as were Italian annexations of Slovenia, Dalmatia and Kossovo, and the other parts ceded to the other Balkan nations). Poland would remain a desolate Soviet protectorate while the former Baltic states would be granted “special autonomy” within the Soviet Union. Post-Athens Europe took shape and would remain thus until the end of the Soviet Union in later decades.

 

29. ITALY AFTER THE WAR

 

            Italy emerged from the war as one of the Great Powers, although, according to British and French, such a status was bought with counterfeit coin. By ruthlessly and opportunistically exploiting her logistic position, the various belligerents’ hopes and being able to place herself in the right position at the right time, Italy was now the political “shepherd” of the Balkans, the “protector” of the new Austro-Hungarian Empire and had an unassailable position in Africa and the Mediterranean. The Yemeni Mandate allowed Italy Asian perspectives as well.

            The influx of immigrants and refugees during the war had provided Italy with the manpower necessary to start sweeping and permanent changes in Africa; the high quality of so many of those Jews, Poles and other Eastern Europeans also gave Italy a new bourgeoisie fanatically loyal to King and Country (and to the Fascist Party: the Jewish Community would be one of the PFI’s main electorates for decades to come).

            The discovery of oil in Libya, and the pro-market economic reforms of the late 30s, likewise had expanded Italian economy and her small industrial base so that this nation could begin the road that would eventually lead her to become one of the top five economic powers of the world.

            In addition to this Italy had forged a unique relationship with the United States, which under Roosevelt and then, after his death in 1946, Truman, began devoting more and more time, resources and attention to Italy, aiding her in her transformation into a regional power (if with global delusions). Low-interest, long terms loans and investment gave Italian enterprises the financial oxygen with which they could expand and modernise.

            Italy had emerged from the war therefore stronger, richer and with far better prospects then most other nations in Europe, but it wasn’t all rosy-tinted.

            American friendship was matched by French hostility and British coolness: the French felt Italy had taken advantage of her defeat to take her place in world politics (an accusation with more then a little merit) and the British couldn’t hide their contempt for a nation that would take with guile what she couldn’t take by strength. Indeed, seeing how Britain had ended footing the larger part of the bill Italy had presented, the British were far less then enthusiastic towards Mussolini, although even their more ill-tempered generals had to admit Italian forces had behaved well during the war, and the Italian air-force, with its Dardos and Tuonos, was indeed a marvel (even more so once the Italians began phasing in radars onto their jets). The Soviets were extremely hostile towards Italy: they accused Italy of doing all in her power to keep them out of Europe and therefore felt betrayed. A certain line of thought in the European Left was that by allowing Italy to join the Allies, their purity of intent and mission had been diluted and corrupt. Indeed, this line of reasoning further went, anything that involved Italy was destined to be tainted of corruption. As Germany slowly reformed herself, the instinctively negative opinion most Germans had for Italy was tempered by the awareness that it was Mussolini’s wartime manoeuvring that had saved their nation from a probably far worse fate. Overall Germany had developed a grudging respect and gratitude for Italy.

            IN addition to that, the situation in Yugoslavia was by no means peaceful: the Serbian government had been overthrown by Tito, who had declared his intention of reuniting all of Yugoslavia. However when he saw that pretty much all the former Yugoslav member states had no intention of aiding him (and even his partisan allies were more interested in shooting each other then establishing a new Yugoslavia), he contented himself with mastery of Serbia. Still border skirmishes between Croatia and Serbia and Bulgaria and Rumania would continue for some time, flaring endemically and threatening to destabilise the area. Likewise, Italy had annexed manu militari, the Tirol, and German press had a very low opinion of that. Although a treaty with Vienna in 1950 formalised these borders, irredentist Tirolese sentiment and terrorism would plague the region for years, before dwindling out in the late 60s.

 

30. THE TWILIGHT OF THE REGIME

 

            But despite all the credit acquired and respect gained, Italy was still a dictatorship. The reins of this dictatorship were exceedingly lax: indeed full freedom of press and speech had been restored by 1943, Gramsci’s “Ordine Nuovo” was read in the newsagents once again, as well as other political periodicals, such as Salvemini’s Unita’; Prezzolini’s La Voce Nuova; the Avanti; Einaudi’s Critica Liberale and others. The House of Representatives, although formally a one-party organism, was divided into various currents that pretty much mirrored most other European parliaments. Nevertheless, as Croce put it, a man was still unable to declare himself a non-fascist, or indeed an anti-fascist, and as long as such a right was unavailable, all of Italy’s progress was for nothing.

            Mussolini was aware of this. Indeed, by the end of the war, he had reached his 62nd birthday and was beginning to feel his years. Admiration for him in Italy reached levels unseen at anytime before, and this time, unlike the past, most of this adulation seemed genuine. Internationally, all pundits hailed him as a great statesman. He knew he could stay in power until he died, if he wanted, but that very weariness began to sap his will. As was later discovered, at some stage in his later years, Mussolini had contracted prostate cancer which, undiagnosed for years, was beginning to make its effects felt. Men such as Grandi and Balbo felt that the “emergency” that had brought about the need for the fascist regime was now over. Time had come for the dictatorship to end and democracy returned to the people. Such thoughts were, for different reasons, shared by the Savoys, the ruling House of Italy. Indeed Victor Emanuel the 3rd by now lived in fear of Mussolini, expecting him to depose the monarchy at any time, fully aware he would able to do so without any opposition. At the same time the king was jealous of the veneration il Duce had received from all sectors of Italian society, not least the military, traditionally formed by Savoyard loyalists. When Victor Emanuel the 3rd died, in 1948, his son Umberto, while a firmer character, nevertheless shared his father’s concerns. Unlike his father, though, Umberto feared more for the growth of Italy as a nation from a political point of view: nigh onto thirty years of regime risked crippling Italy’s politics forever. It was time for an end.

            Most people felt this, even the Fascist Party itself. By 1949 all political parties had begun their activity again: although in theory they were still legally banned, not even the most fanatic fascist felt they could stop them, not did they want to. Some fascists felt that the regime had accomplished all it had set out to do. Others felt that only by an open confrontation with its political adversaries, only by resuming an open political struggle, could fascism find new energies. Still by now an entire generation had been born and raised knowing only Mussolini as their head of government, and what more, they had seen him succeed in all he had set out to do, had seen him turn Italy in a world power. Likewise the millions of refugees and settlers who were now full citizens felt deep gratitude for Mussolini and his regime. As Dino Grandi guessed, by lifting the ban on the parties now, and facing political competition in these circumstances, Fascism could ensure a long life as a regular member of the democratic and parliamentary concert. In addition, Fascism could promote what most people thought was necessary: a constitutional reform.

 

31. THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

 

            The Italian constitution of 1848, the Albertine Statute, was a document that had shown its time and should now, over a century after its elaboration, be put aside for a new one. Mussolini therefore agreed to lift the ban on the political parties, call new elections, both for the House of Representatives (the Senate had different electoral procedures) and a Convention that would write the new constitution.

            In the political elections of 1950, the Italian Fascist Party (P.F.I.) got 45% of national vote. The Socialists (P.S.I.) got 30%; the Liberals (P.L.I.) got 10%, the Christian Democrats (P.P.I.) 10% and the “Actionist Party” (P. d’A.I.) got another 5%. The Communist Party hadn’t presented itself, as it was viciously divided between Gramsci (whose politics were getting more and more distant from official Moscow doctrine) and Togliatti, a Stalinist loyalist. The new Italian constitution was prepared: a strong central “imperial” government would oversee local federal states with great degrees of autonomy. In theory all inhabitants were full citizens (that included the natives in the colonies) but the full exercise of political rights would be subject to certain requirements. A Supreme Court, closely based on the US model, was created and the Senate was reformed.

            With this new constitution in place, Mussolini stepped down from the head of the government, after 27 years. Italo Balbo won the congressional battle for the succession (beating Ciano) and became the new head of the PFI, although it would be Dino Grandi to preside a national unity government that would enact the new constitution. The Fascists remained in power, either with allies or alone, until 1960, when a coalition of the other parties, il Governo di Alternativa Nazionale managed to oust them. After five years of fractious coalitions, two alliances broadly formed, a Fascist-Liberal one and a Socialist-Actionist one, with the Christian Democrats alternatively siding with one or the other.

            Benito Mussolini died June the 12th 1954, at the age of 71. The state funerals were impressive, with the heads of state of the world converging to pay their respects.

 

32. ITALY AFTER MUSSOLINI

 

            IN the years since Mussolini’s death, Italy has progressed, both economically and socially. The Monarchy, under the capable lead of Umberto the 2nd, has re-established itself as a unifying factor. Politics are stable, with coalitions that peacefully alternate themselves in then running of the nation. By adopting a policy of almost aggressive integration, and by substantially altering the demographic composition of the African territories, the Empire has survived, in federal form, where other colonial empires have vanished (violently as was the case of France and Algeria, leading to De Gaulle’s coup in 1957). This hasn’t been a painless process: some nationalities, such as the Libyans, suddenly finding themselves a minority in their own homes, reacted violently, with anti-Semitic riots (the last of which were put down quite violently by colonel Gheddafi, a resolute Fascist). At other times, the growing African bourgeoisie has demanded equal room for its native culture in the schools’ curricula. There are still separatist and nationalist movements in Ethiopia.

            Italy’s economy has been on an upwards spiral, with the occasional fit and start, so that great prosperity is felt by a majority of the population. Still there are areas of poverty, such as parts of Italy’s south, Albania and inland Somalia that still need to be addressed. Public services could improve, and the bureaucracy has not been above reproach, in terms of efficiency and honesty. Organised crime is a problem in certain parts of the nations, Sicily, Tunisia and parts of Ethiopia especially.

            Still, as a founding member of the European Economic Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations, Italy is part of the global community and looks set to remain an important player therein for a long time to come.  

 
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