Professionals Study Logistics

Updated Sunday 15 May, 2011 12:18 PM

Professionals Study Logistics

I had promised Chris an article. Changed the topic as a result of an argument from one of my militaria yahoo groups. I regard both Ike and Monty as lousy field commanders. Monty was set piece, overly fussy and was essentially a butcher. Ike was never able to control his subordinates or manage his time. From Tunisia to Sicily to Italy to Normandy to the final fall of Germany they fought on almost everything. Yet the one plan they agreed on Arnhem was part of a group error that led to the single biggest Allied botch of the 1944-45 campaign, Antwerp.

The facts are simple and really beyond contest.

The Allied logistical plan never allowed for the sort of German collapse that followed Cobra and Falaise. We projected a sane defense in which the Germans would fight a series of bloody delaying battles from Normandy to the German frontier, trying to salvage a draw by attrition.
Normandy was MUCH harder fought than our plans allowed for so the lodgment area for the supply buildup before the breakout was much smaller than envisioned.
Our plan also did not allow for the Germans leaving garrisons to hold each French port after they were cut off and essentially destroying them in the defense if we attacked. After one port in Brittany proved this we essentially blockaded them for the remainder of the war. In turn this meant doing without the port capacity.
We then did a VERY sloppy job of implementing what plan we had. J.H.C. Lee [Ike’s logistics chief] was a disaster who made matters worse by his many actions. No one made capturing the French railroads or rolling stock intact, so it mostly wasn’t. The rebuilding of the logistic infrastructure was mostly left to Lee and DeGaulle who each had other priorities. The bulk of the heavy trucks sent for Monty proved to be defective.
Ike and Monty squabbled over broad versus narrow front with neither giving logistics any mind. The issue should never have been Lorraine versus Aachen versus Monty [Arnhem]. It should have been logistics.
Ike and Monty were handed a gift from the gods and ignored it. The British 30^th Corps took Antwerp on 4 September 1944. Thanks to a brilliant action by the Belgian resistance the port facilities were captured intact. And the British then stopped. Antwerp is an inland port. To use it one must possess the access route to the sea, the Scheldt Estuary. At the moment of capture the Scheldt was essentially undefended. The potential defenders [the German 15^th Army] was retreating ahead of the Canadian 1^st Army but was still some distance away and completely dependant on a last narrow supply corridor through Bergen op Zoom which was another day’s march at an easy pace from Antwerp. However nothing was done. Ike and Monty were both mesmerized by the Rhine and the chance [never real] of a victory before Christmas. British 2^nd Army paused to refit and resupply while shifting its attention to its other flank in preparation for Arnhem. Clearing the Scheldt was left to the weak 1^st Canadian Army which was also far to the rear, had other ports to mask or clear, and in any event was never given clearing the Scheldt as a priority. So a month was lost until the Canadians caught up to launch the clearance operation. Another month of very bloody fighting was needed to open Antwerp. Two months of resupply were then lost which gave Hitler a chance to let Speer’s massive armaments burst of production provide enough weapons to rebuild the German armies one last time. http://users.pandora.be/dave.depickere/Text/scheldt.html

http://www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/wwii/belgium.html

But if…

As was later admitted the lead British armored division in fact did have one more day’s fuel. Have it push on to Bergen op Zoom. Poof. No more German supply line except by sea through the islands of the Scheldt estuary. Next organize the remaining UK Channel forces to shuttle troops into the islands. Normal Allied amphibious ops were over planned slow ops. This means Ike and Monty having the balls to see the opportunity and take risks.

1. There were two British airborne divisions in the UK.

2. There were a few weak commando brigades

3. There was the equivalent of a Polish corps

4. There were half a dozen British divisions in various states of unreadiness [UK was drawing down on these divisions to meet their perpetual replacement crisis]

5. There was also a UK air landing division

Now what we are talking about is an ad lib. There will be photogenic Dieppe style disasters where what amount to scratch light infantry forces are ferried in fishing boats into German units with heavy weapons. However most of the Germans beyond the few coast defense units were days away. With Bergen in Allied hands German ammo resupply is virtually impossible. If the Allied air forces make this a priority daylight resistance by the Germans is futile. So presume that the British can ferry a brigade plus some weapons and supplies a day. Over a week they lose some 5-10K mostly Empire troops but clear the Scheldt. German 15^th Army is penned up south of the estuary. They mostly retreat back into the Channel ports where the Canadians mask them.

Now presume also that Ike actually makes 21^st AG THE supply priority. Fires Lee and risks Marshall’s wrath. Meets Bradley and Patton’s temper tantrums by telling them they can both be replaced but neither is getting ANY resupply until the port situation is resolved. Calls Churchill and Marshall to insist he needs Combined Bomber force back NOW. Churchill can deliver Harris [or more likely Harris’s successor] which in turn gets Marshall to deliver Arnold. The heavies are used as air taxis to ferry supplies to Belgium for Monty. If necessary sack every bomber general.

However the flip side of this is that Monty goes for more ports, not the Rhine at Arnhem. German 15^th Army is not arriving in line in this TL. With supply there is virtually nothing to prevent Monty from taking Rotterdam and Amsterdam over the 2^nd and 3^rd weeks. The Germans will partially wreck both ports and blow some of the dykes but German 25^th Army [the garrison in Holland] was quite small and extremely disorganized at this time – essentially with the disasters happening elsewhere Army Group B had simply not made keeping these troops updated a priority. Most sources agree that with a bit of a push they’d have just joined the retreat to Germany without taking time for the sort of careful demolition the Germans were known for. So the end of September finds Antwerp becoming the main supply source for 21^st and 12^th Army Groups and Rotterdam and Amsterdam rapidly coming on stream. The downsides are the loss of what ground was gained elsewhere in September in OTL and having to feed some millions of mostly starving Dutch many of whom have been flooded out of their homes.

Now Ike might well have been fired over the media storm from halting Bradley and Patton. The US press would have had a cow and both nation’s press would have had major questions at the bomber hordes reduced to expensive transport planes. Speer would also have gotten a month’s breather to turn out more arms at a time of his greatest production feats.

None of that compares with the fact that the Allies are in fact across the Rhine advancing over the relatively easy terrain between the Rhine and the Zeeder Zee. The left flank on the Zee can also benefit from monitors and small craft brought in for fire support and end runs. This in turn fixes the German defensive intentions firmly on this sector. The October attacks that hit Patton in Lorraine all hit here. With the supply situation solved Monty and Ike get to fight their kind of battle – limited frontage and maximum expenditure of artillery ammo, which is now abundant through Antwerp. Also with Holland in allied hands the last V-2 attack points against the UK are gone.

With the main German strength against Monty, Patton and Devers will have an easier time. Ike will again spring back to a broad front but this time he will have his logistics firmly in place. So when the push meets resistance in one place, it can stop and push somewhere else. More on the lines of Foch’s approach to 1918. We get to skip the suicidal Hurtgen Forrest battle. We have enough troops [in OTL divisions were held back in the UK from lack of supply] and supplies for defensive measures so there is no weak sector like the Ardennes. By the end of December Monty will have fought his way into Germany while Bradley and Devers will have closed up to the Rhine.

I leave the issue of whether Berlin will then become a priority or we still stick to the occupation zones to the reader. However the two Western leaders go to Yalta with a FAR stronger hand.

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